Gabriel G Tabarani
In politics, as in markets, the most dangerous assumptions are the ones that appear stable for too long. Few have been as deeply embedded in the Gulf as the belief that security can be guaranteed through alliances—much like a long-term contract. Recent events suggest otherwise.
Not because alliances no longer matter. But because they no longer mean what they used to.
For decades, Gulf security rested on a simple equation: strong ties with major powers—above all, the United States—would ensure deterrence and protection in moments of crisis. That model worked in a more stable international environment, when global priorities were less crowded and commitments more predictable.
Today, the landscape has shifted. Major powers operate under tighter constraints and broader strategic competition. Their decisions are shaped as much by domestic pressures and global rivalries as by regional commitments. The result is not disengagement, but selectivity.
In this context, “guarantees” have become a misleading concept.
The United States remains the Gulf’s most important security partner. Its systems, training and expertise are central to regional defence. But its role is increasingly defined by what it enables, not what it promises to do. The distinction is subtle, but decisive: a partner is no longer the one who intervenes, but the one who equips.
This is the real shift.
The issue has never been the absence of partners, but the misunderstanding of partnerships. Great powers do not extend security guarantees independent of their interests. They support, deter and supply—but they act according to their own priorities. When those priorities collide—between Asia, domestic politics and economic pressures—responses to regional crises become conditional.
The relevant question, then, is no longer: who will defend us? It is: how do we reduce the need for others to do so?
This is the direction in which Gulf strategic thinking is moving. The goal is no longer simply to diversify partners, but to redefine security itself—from borrowed protection to accumulated capability.
The difference is structural.
In one model, risk is managed externally. In the other, external actors reinforce internal strength.
This shift is also driven by the nature of modern conflict. Warfare is no longer dominated by heavy conventional forces alone. It increasingly relies on cheaper, more flexible tools—drones, swarm attacks, electronic disruption—that prioritise persistence over superiority.
Here lies the emerging imbalance: defence can be more expensive than attack.
When low-cost systems are deployed at scale, even the most advanced defences face attrition. This is not just a military challenge; it is an economic one. Security is no longer defined by deterrence alone, but by sustainability. The ability to endure matters as much as the ability to respond.
That changes how security must be built.
It is no longer enough to acquire advanced systems. The focus must shift to cost management, adaptability and operational efficiency—to moving from owning the best to running the best effectively.
In this sense, security is no longer purely a defence issue. It is an industrial one. Maintenance capacity, partial domestic production and the ability to adapt systems locally are becoming core elements of sovereignty. Without them, even well-equipped states risk bottlenecks under pressure.
This does not imply isolation or full self-sufficiency—neither is realistic. It implies a different relationship with partners: one based on knowledge transfer, integration and optionality, rather than dependency.
Accordingly, alliances themselves are evolving. The future is less about a single dominant patron and more about a network of specialised partnerships—one providing technology, another expertise, a third operational experience. This diversification increases flexibility, but demands careful management to avoid friction.
Perhaps the most difficult adjustment is psychological. Moving beyond the idea of guaranteed protection is not easy in a region long accustomed to external security anchors. Yet the new environment leaves little choice.
Security is no longer measured by proximity to power, but by the ability to withstand its delay.
This is not a pessimistic conclusion. It is a pragmatic one. States that build their own capabilities gain leverage—over adversaries and partners alike. Their alliances become more balanced, because they are based on choice, not necessity.
What is unfolding in the Gulf is not the erosion of security, but its redefinition. A shift from an era where external umbrellas provided reassurance, to one where security must be built as a long-term national project.
The lesson is clear: security is not imported. It is built.
This article was originally published in Arabic on the Asswak Al-Arab website
